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Abstract
This paper defines informal sector employment and decomposes the difference in
earnings between formal and informal sector employees in Tajikistan for 2007. Using
quantile regression decomposition technique proposed by JAE, 20:445-465, 2005 and
considering self-selection of individuals into different employment types, we find a
significant informal employment wage premium across the whole earnings distribution.
Taking advantage of RES, 90:290-299, 2008 matching approach and considering the
possibility of misleading results due to different observed characteristics of formal and
informal workers, we still find a wage gap in favour of informal sector workers.
JEL codes: J21; J23; J24; J31
Keywords: Formal/informal employment; Quantile regression decomposition;
Matching; Endogeneity
1 Introduction
The size of informal sector, cited as the central factor underlying wage inequality, poverty
and labour market inefficiency, has always attracted attention in all transition and devel-
oping countries and Tajikistan is not an exception. The National Human Development
Report (2010) for Tajikistan shows that during 2008–2009 over 47% of employment in the
country was in the informal sector. The number of people employed in this sector was
estimated to be over 1 million.
It is generally assumed, and empirically supported by much of the literature, that work-
ers in the informal sector are paid less than their formal sector counterparts. Empirically
and theoretically it is not clear why this should be the case. There are a number of explana-
tions offered, most of which are based on a segmented view of the labour market (Badaoui
et al. (2008)). The presence of barriers to entry into the formal sector could be a possi-
ble cause (Fields (1975); Mazumdar (1975)). A wage penalty for informal workers might
be due to sorting, where those with lower human capital are more likely to work in the
informal sector (Tokman (1982)). Marcouiller et al. (1997) show a significant wage pre-
mium in the informal sector in Mexico, while in El Salvador and Peru formal workers
have a higher wage premium. However, evidence in favour of the existence of a wage pre-
mium for formal worker depends on the category of informal job (e.g. self-employed are,
in general, better paid than salaried workers). Using the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey, Braithwaite (1995) and Kolev (1998) find higher wage premium in secondary jobs,
compared to the main job, which are the main locus of the informal economic activities.
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Lehmann and Zaiceva (2013) show a wage penalty in the lower part of the distribution
and no statistically significant difference between informal and formal wages in the upper
half of the distribution for salaried workers in Russia. In contrast, by including informal
self-employed and entrepreneurs the authors find significantly positive in the upper part
of the distribution, pointing to a segmented informal sector with a lower free entry tier
and an upper rationed tier. Carneiro and Henley (2001) indicate that differences in earn-
ings are strongly explained by the non-observable characteristics of workers who decide
to join each sector. Wu and Li (2006) show that about 90 percent of the observed formal-
informal monthly income differential in urban China can be explained by differences in
observed characteristics.
One of the major difficulties in being able to identify and understand the informal sec-
tor employment has been the lack of consensus on how to define and measure informal
sector activities. Whilst there is a large literature on the informal economy, very few stud-
ies have applied it so far to the transition economies. An improved understanding of the
formal/informal pay differential is crucial for addressing country’s welfare, equity and
poverty consequences. In this regard the present study complement the existing litera-
ture by capturing the diversity of informal sector employment in Tajikistan and estimating
earnings differential along several dimensions. First, we try to distinguish and define
informal sector employment in Tajikistan a country that has received little attention in
the literature and provides rich evidence for a large and heterogeneous labour market.
Household survey data available for Tajikistan contains detailed information on individual
household member economic status and permits some comparison of alternative infor-
mality definitions. It cannot be assumed that different definitions are broadly consistent
and therefore, any particular choice of definition measurement is important.
Second, earnings gap is commonly used to test for the existence of segmented ver-
sus competitive labour markets. Large differentials are often viewed as an evidence for
institutional rigidities in the labour markets and thus suggesting need for a policy action
considering equity and efficiency purposes. To provide a more detailed insight into the
formal-informal pay differential, the current study looks across the entire conditional
earnings distribution by extending Machado-Mata procedure (2005), where for the non-
discriminatory wage structure we followNeumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994)
procedure. The methodology employed decomposes the earnings gap into differences
in endowments of skills and differences in returns to these skills. Disentangling the
formal/informal pay gap along various quantiles of the earnings distribution enables a
multidimensional array of policy implications. In this fashion, one can also address the
issue of heterogeneity within formal and informal sectors which is often an important
issue in such earnings analyses.
Third, the main challenge in earnings gap analysis is to control for a possible sam-
ple selection bias which may result from either self-selection of individuals into different
employment types (formal/informal). The importance of controlling for endogeneity lies
in the fact that it allows us also to discuss the role that changes in the distribution of unob-
served ability might play in the observed changes of the earnings distribution. Finally,
we consider that possible differences in the distribution of observed characteristics of
the formal and informal workers may lead to biases for the estimates in the preceding
section. Following Ñopo (2008), we use matching, as an alternative to the linear specifi-
cation approach, to identify workers in the formal sector that display the same observable
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characteristics as informal sector, and compare their wages across the distribution. The
method does not require estimating earnings equation for formal and informal sector
workers, and thus it is not necessary to assume that the linear estimators of the earnings
equations are valid out of the supports of individual characteristics for which they were
estimated (Ñopo (2008)). The purpose of implemented matching approach is to balance
the unobservables by adjusting for pre-treatment observable differences between sectors.
There are a number of econometric issues involved in the decomposition meth-
ods applied. Obviously, matching has advantage over the traditional linear regressions,
recognizing importance of differences in the support and being less computationally
demanding. It is possible also to obtain a distribution of the formal-informal pay differ-
ences. The considered method has also an advantage in the estimation of the gap, because
it is based on the matching between observable individuals and as a result, does not
need to account for selection bias such as in other decomposition methods. However, we
should mention the curse of dimensionality - the use of manymatching characteristics for
a single matching discrete variable may reduce the chances of obtaining adequate number
of matched observations (Ñopo (2008)).
The remainder of the paper is structured as followed. In section 2, we provide a brief
discussion of the Tajikistan’s labour market. A discussion of the existing literature on
measuring informal sector employment and our propose measure is given in Section 3.
Section 4 discusses the data, and section 5 presents the econometricmethodology. Finally,
sections 6 and 7 discuss the main results and conclusions.
2 Tajikistan’s labour market
Tajikistan has one of the lowest per capita GDP among the 15 former Soviet republics and
was among the worst affected by transition experiencing hyperinflation and the collapse
of industrial production aggravated by a five-year civil war (1992 to 1997) (Falkingham
(2000)). The financial crisis in Russia in August 1998 additionally altered the economic
environment in the country.
Tajikistan’s economic transition from a centrally planned system towards a more
market-oriented economy began around 1997 and most of the ensuing period has been
a story of recovery from war rather than transition. While steady economic growth since
1997, nearly two-thirds of the population continue to live in poverty. In 2003, 68% of Tajiks
lived below the national poverty line (Kohl et al. (2008)). Because of a lack of employ-
ment opportunities in Tajikistan, nearly half of the labour force works abroad, primarily
in Russia and Kazakhstan, supporting their families in Tajikistan through remittances
(National Human Development Report (2010)). Unemployment was a major push factor
of migration. Olimova and Bosc (2003) find that 14.5% of all interviewedmigrants had not
worked before leaving the country, indicating poor labour prospects. The increase in the
working-age population affected the informal sector, where employment grew by almost
300% over the period 1991 to 2005 (National Human Development Report (2010)).
Employment challenges in Tajikistan were multidimensional, and ranged from high
unemployment rates to diverse forms of under-employment and a lack of skilled labour
to respond to enterprises needs. While a member of the Soviet Union, the country had
an essentially formal labour market, where the state was responsible for ensuring that
everyone had a job. Since independence in 1991 decrease in production and the closure
of state-owned companies has led to massive job losses (Kröger andMeier (2011)). Due to
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the privatisation policy pursued in the period 1991–2007, the share of workers employed
in the private sector increased and the share of workers employed in the state-owned sec-
tor decreased (Table 1). The state sector shrunk mainly due to the transition and also due
to the overall economic collapse brought about by the decline of the Soviet economy.
According to official statistics, in the period 1991–2007, employment distribution
by economic sector changed dramatically. The proportion of the workforce employed
in industry declined and the proportion employed in agriculture increased more than
1.6 times. In 2008, 67.2% of the labour force participation was in agriculture, 7.5% in
industry, and 25.3% in services. Figure 1, which plots the labour force participation rate
in Tajikistan since 1980, indicates that under the Soviet rule, participation rates were
relatively high with almost 80% of men and 60% of women being employed. After the
collapse of the Soviet Union and the civil war between 1992 and 1997, participation rate
of both men and women decreased significantly. An analysis of the outcomes of various
surveys shows a decline of unemployment rate for the period 1999–2004. According
to the Tajikistan Living Standards Measurement Survey (LSMS) conducted in 1999,
the unemployment rate was 16% but it declined to 11.4% in 2002 based on the Poverty
Reduction Monitoring Survey Table 2.
The increase in informal activities over the post-Soviet period has been related to the
outflow of workers from the formal sector, the slow growth of private formal employment
and the growth of open unemployment. The informal sector has acted as a large labour
reserve during the transition processes the one Tajikistan has been experiencing, and as
a shorter-term shock-absorber that expands in times of economic recession and shrinks
during periods of economic recovery.
3 Defining informality
It is particularly important, given recent developments in the debate on measuring
informality, to carefully distinguish between informal and formal sector employment.
Informal employment, sometimes known as undeclared, hidden or grey employment,
can be broadly described as employment engaged in producing legal goods and ser-
vices where one or more of the legal requirements associated with employment are not
complied with OECD (2008). The informal economy is traditionally viewed as the disad-
vantaged sector employing unskilled, less educated, urban migrants or ethnic minorities
Table 1 Employment by ownership and economic sector in Tajikistan, 1991–2007
1991 1998 2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total employment (million) 1,971 1,796 1,745 1,857 2,090 2,112 2,137 2,150
Ownership (%)
State − owned 59.4 42.7 32 27.8 26.5 25.7 25.1 24.2
Private1 19.1 33.1 43.1 44 50 51.2 50.7 51.8
Collective2 20.4 23.2 23.8 27.5 22.6 22.2 23.2 22.9
Economic sector (%)
Industry 13 8.2 6.9 6.6 5.6 5.7 5.5 5.5
Construction 7.5 2.9 2.1 1.8 1.6 3.3 2.9 3
Agriculture 44.7 60.7 65 66.6 67.6 66.6 67.5 67
Note:
1Personal subsidiary plots and farms, individual labour activities, private enterprises.
2Collective farms, cooperatives, public associations.
Source: State Statistics Committee.
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Figure 1 Labour participation rate in Tajikistan, 1980–2008.
(Mazumdar (1983)). Thus, it plays a negative role in the economy by decreasing official
output, reducing government tax revenue and constraining the growth of the private sec-
tor (Johnson et al. (1997); Lacko (2000)). The informal employees lack social security
coverage and some or all of the protections provided by labour contracts.
Although the term has been very widely used, its meaning is not clear. There is no pre-
cise definition and consensus over what constitutes informal sector employment and how
to measure it. In many cases researchers choice of definition is determined by the avail-
ability of data. Thus, the informal sector has been referred to as street vendors, domestic
workers or unregistered small-scale activities in developing countries, and drug traf-
ficking and prostitution in western countries. Some authors argue that all self-employed
workers should be included in the informal sector, while others include only those who
are not paying social security contributions and are outside any employment protection.
Legalistic definition of informality refers to the avoidance of formal registration, taxation
and the lack of social security protection. Merrick (1976) defines informal sector workers
by their lack of social security status. International Labour Offices (ILO) (2003) defini-
tion is based on employees in small establishment size of fewer than 5–10 employees
(depending on the country). Pradhan and van Soest (1995) use a definition of fewer than
6 employees for Bolivia and Mexico; Funkhouser (1997) uses fewer than 5 employees for
an analysis of five Central American countries. Under the guidelines of the statistical def-
inition of informal employment established by the International Conference of Labour
Statisticians in 2003, informal employment includes casual jobs or jobs with limited
short duration; jobs with hours of work or wages below a specified threshold; employ-
ment of persons in households; jobs where the employee’s place of work is outside the
premises of the employer’s enterprise; or jobs for which labour regulations are not applied
(Daza (2005)).
Henley et al. (2009) indicate three definitions of informality - first, according to the
employment contract status, second, according to the social security protection and
Table 2 Changes in general unemployment in Tajikistan (%), 1991–2004
1991 1999 2000 2002 2003 2004
Unemployment rate - 16 9.3 11.4 12 7.4
Labour force participation rate 76.5 69.1 63.2 - 64.2 66.5
Source: 1991, official statistics; 1999, Tajikistan Living Standards Measurement Survey; 2000, Census; 2002 Poverty Reduction
Monitoring Survey; 2003 Tajikistan Living Standards Survey; 2004 LFS.
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finally according to the nature of the employment and the characteristics of the employer.
More specifically, the way of defining informality in developing countries does matters
and the conditional impact of particular factors on the likelihood of informality varies
considerably from one definition to another. Where information on contract status is not
available, the alternative definition of informal employment is by the lack of social protec-
tion. For instance, Portes et al. (1989), Marcouiller et al. (1997) andMaloney (1999) define
workers as informal employees by the criterion of no social protection and security. Bern-
abe (2002) applies the typology of informal employment in Georgia by using proxies for
household enterprises and non-regular employment. A study by Gasparini and Tornarolli
(2009) defines as informal employees who are engaged in low-productive jobs, often
family-based activities. There are a group of researchers who view the informal labour
market in line with the survival-oriented informal activities. Johnson et al. (1997) identify
six types of survival strategies used in Russia, which they refer to as informal activities:
having a second job; using land to grow food; working as a private taxi driver; renting out
ones apartment; business trips abroad for resale and renting out ones garage. A recent
study by Abdulloev et al. (2012) use discrepancy between reported household expendi-
ture and reported household income in Tajikistan as an indication of informal/unreported
activity. Their approach does not need detailed information about the working environ-
ment (firm characteristics or worker protection) to assign individuals to informal sector
activity.
The informal employment literature is moving away from a traditional view of informal-
ity as evidence for labour market segmentation. Rather than seeing informal employment
as a survival mechanism for low-productivity workers who are queuing until they find a
better paid job opportunity, recent empirical studies argue that some informal workers
‘choose’ informal employment. They do so because informal employment offers them a
better financial return on their skills or experience (OECD (2008)). Additionally, infor-
mal sector offers flexibility in hours, place of work, and allows small businesses with
entrepreneur ability to become successful. Maloney (1999) suggests that the informal sec-
tor in developing countries may be a desirable choice. Individuals working in the informal
sector benefit from flexibility in terms of working hours, and in some cases choice of work
location. This aspect may be especially valued by women with children. At the same time,
because wages of the ‘unofficially employed’ are not subject to taxation, salaries in the
informal sector may be significantly higher compared to post tax salaries in the formal
sector. This suggests that workers may face an improved wage offer in the informal sector
compared to the formal sector (Henley et al. (2009)).
3.1 Defining informal employment in Tajikistan
In the process of transition to market economy, the structure and character of informal
employment in Tajikistan has changed. Informal employment has reached a consid-
erable scale contributing approximately 35 percent to Gross National Product (OECD
(2007)). Some commentators argue that the country seems to have entered into a pro-
cess that has already taken hold in other countries Latin America, sub-Saharan Africa
and many Asian countries, where there is a tendency towards informalisation of the
formal sector (Wallenborn (1982)). According to the Tajikistan Labour Force Survey
(LFS) in 2004 the share of employment in the informal sector of the country was 53.3%.
The National Human Development Report (2007) survey on the informal economy in
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Tajikistan shows that the main reason why some firms prefer to use informal methods,
are the overcomplicated and burdensome formal procedures and the low quality of civil
servants, which seem to encourage firms to try avoiding them by resorting to informal
methods in an effort to minimize costs of operation.
On the question what is the main reason to accept a job without social security benefits,
26% of respondents from the 2007 Tajikistan survey indicated that social security bene-
fits are not important and 20% answered that they could have received more money by
working in the informal sector. About 57% of the respondents working without a signed
contract reported that they were satisfied with their current job conditions. However, not
all people in the informal sector are there by choice. Many individuals may be displaced
involuntarily into this sector because this is their only chance of securing an income.
Around 44% of the respondents in the 2007 survey stated that they actually have no other
choice and therefore would accept a job without social security benefits.
In line with Henley et al. (2009), we adopt three different definitions of informality
for Tajikistan1. Table 3 presents proportions of workers, who report wages and who are
classified as informal under each of the following:
Definition A contract status: there is a widespread belief that employment relations
should be legitimized in a written employment contract. A person is classified as an infor-
mal worker if he/she works without a signed labour contract. The data indicates that
50.4% of all economically active in the sample are employed without any written contract.
Overall, 39.3% of employees, 93.7% of self-employees, and 94.1% of domestic workers
work without any written contract (see Table 3).
Definition B social security affiliation status: a person is defined as an informal employee
if he/she has no affiliation to the social security scheme. Based on this definition 52.4% of
all workers who report wages have no social security affiliation.
Definition C establishment size: a person is defined as informal if he/she is employed in
an establishment of less than five employees. However, including only enterprises with
less than five employees results in possible inclusion of some professionals andmanagerial
workers (2.3%) who could have relatively high incomes and who are considered to be in
the formal sector. Therefore, we exclude professional group from definition C. This mea-
sure provides the smallest estimates at around 31% of all economically active workers as
being informal. Around 19% of economically active employees and 70% of self-employed
are covered by this definition (see Table 3).
Table 3 Proportion of informal employees bymain employment status, Tajikistan 2007
Economically active All Employees Self-employed Domestic workers
A. No signed labour contracts 50.4% 39.3% 93.7% 94.1%
B. No social security affiliation 52.4% 41.5% 94.4% 96.2%
C. Establishment size and no professionals 30.5% 19.3% 70.2% 85.3%
Pure informal workers 25.3% 13.9% 65.9% 78.6%
Informal at least in one of the three approaches 65.4% 56.9% 98.1% 99.7%
Employees in the sample 80.1% - - -
Self-employees in the sample 15.3% - - -
Domestic workers in the sample 4.6% - - -
Notes: The proportions are based on a sample of workers that report wages. Source: Authors calculations from Tajikistan
2007 LSMS.
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About 25% of the workforce can be classified as informal by all three measures and
around 40% of workers are classified as informal on the basis of having no signed labour
contract and no social security coverage. The percentage of workers classed as informal
under measure A and measure B, but not under measure C is 14.4%. Around 27% of the
economically active are classified as informal workers on the basis of having no social
security membership and working in the small establishment size.
Table 4 reveals the different proportions of males and females for these three definitions
of informality. Informal employment amongst males is highest when measured by no
social security affiliation and lowest when measured by establishment size. Female infor-
mality is highest when measured by contract status. Around 44% of females work without
any written contract. Overall, female informality is much lower. Defining informality by
all three approaches indicates that 31.9% of males and 14.9% of females in Tajikistan work
as informal.
Different definitions of informality are capturing different groups of workers. Each indi-
cator on its own has conceptual and statistical shortcomings as a proxy for informal
employment but taken together they may provide a robust approximation. Lehman and
Zaiceva (2013) find that the incidence of informal employment varies widely across defini-
tions. Kapeliushnikov (2012) also confirms that depending on its definition, the incidence
of informal employment can vary between 10% to 25% and that the social and demo-
graphic profile of informal workers changes when using different definitions. The current
paper considers as informal all individuals who operate without social security affiliation,
who are employed in small enterprises and who work without any written contract. At the
same time, we place in the formal sector those workers who are not classified as informal
under any of the three measures.
4 The data
The data used in this paper is from the 2007 Tajikistan Living Standard Measure-
ment Survey (LSMS), which provides comprehensive information on education, health,
employment, housing, migration and income. Table 5 reports the means and standard
deviations of the chosen variables broken down into those working in the formal and
those employed in the informal sector, defined as above. Samples are tested to see whether
the data sets support separation. The reported t-statistics in the descriptive table indicate
that almost all variables are significantly different from each other. After dropping obser-
vations with missing values for the variables used in the estimation we were left with a
total number of 8,123 individuals. Of these observations 25% were for individuals who fall
into all three informal definitions. Hourly net earnings are defined as reported monthly
Table 4 Proportion of informal employees by gender, Tajikistan 2007
Economically active Males Females t-test
A. No signed labour contracts 54.6% 43.8% 9.51
B. No social security affiliation 59.4% 41.2% 16.25
C. Establishment size and no professionals 38.2% 18.3% 20.42
Pure informal workers 31.9% 14.9% 18.48
Informal at least in one of three approaches 70.8% 56.7% 12.91
Notes: The proportions are based on a sample of workers that report wages; t-test for difference between women and men.
Source: Authors calculations from Tajikistan 2007 LSMS.
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Table 5 Summary statistics, 2007 Tajikistan
Formal Informal
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. t-stat
lhwage Log of hourly wage 1.09 1.20 1.91 1.04 -27.83
school Years in education 10.47 3.06 9.34 2.22 15.35
age Age 36.16 13.00 34.80 12.01 4.18
agesq Age squared 1476.62 1001.95 1355.30 885.15 4.88
tenure1 1 if less than 7 months 0.12 0.32 0.16 0.37 -5.67
tenure2 1 if 1 if 7–12 months 0.09 0.28 0.12 0.33 -4.91
tenure3 1 if 1–2 years 0.17 0.38 0.23 0.42 -5.86
tenure4 1 if 3–5 years 0.22 0.42 0.25 0.43 -2.20
tenure5 1 if 6–10 years 0.12 0.32 0.11 0.32 0.61
married 1 if married 0.62 0.49 0.68 0.47 -4.59
ethnicity 1 if Tajik ethnicity 0.74 0.44 0.78 0.42 -3.50
female 1 if Female 0.44 0.50 0.23 0.42 17.42
private 1 if in Private sector 0.44 0.50 0.65 0.48 -17.32
occupat1 1 if Administrative 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.03 5.78
occupat2 1 if Skilled &Trade 0.06 0.24 0.31 0.46 -31.54
occupat3 1 if Service 0.31 0.46 0.11 0.31 18.25
occupat4 1 if Sales 0.12 0.32 0.31 0.46 -20.70
occupat5 1 if Machines &oper 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.33 -13.10
occupat6 1 if Elementary 0.10 0.30 0.15 0.36 -6.45
rural 1 if Rural 0.64 0.50 0.56 0.50 6.88
region1 1 if Dushanbe region 0.19 0.39 0.23 0.42 -4.46
region2 1 if Sogd region 0.17 0.37 0.27 0.45 -10.71
region3 1 if Khatlon region 0.39 0.49 0.20 0.40 15.51
region4 1 if Rrp region 0.16 0.37 0.24 0.43 -8.33
region5 1 if Gbao region 0.10 0.30 0.05 0.22 6.71
N 6065 2058
earnings divided by 4.33 and then divided by reported weekly hours of work. The con-
trol variables used in the analysis include education (total number of years of schooling),
age (linear and quadratic terms), variables for individuals years of tenure with the current
firm, controls for marital status, Tajik ethnicity, private sector employment, occupations,
rural settlement, and a set of regional variables to pick up regional effects.
The descriptive statistics highlight some interesting patterns. The logarithm of hourly
net earnings in the informal sector is higher than those found in the formal sector. The
kernel density, which plots both densities, shows that the informal wage curve is situated
to the right of the formal sector one. Empirical evidence suggests that higher minimum
wages are associated with lower formal sector employment, at least in countries where
the minimum wage is binding in the formal sector (e.g. Carneiro (2001)). Examining the
earnings distribution of formal and informal employees provides an indication of whether
the minimum wage is binding for formal employees, a key determinant of whether min-
imum wage has an impact on informality. The vertical line in Figure 2 represents the
minimum wage. Very few formal employees and even a smaller proportion of informal
employees earn less than the minimum wage. Based on this evidence, it seems unlikely
that the minimum wage is a particular important cause of informality in Tajikistan.
The quantile-quantile (Q-Q) plot shows that all observations are below the diago-
nal line, implying that wages for informal workers are higher than their formal workers
2014, 3:1
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Figure 2 Kernel density estimates of log hourly wage in formal and informal sector. Source: Tajikistan
2007 LSMS. 12007 Minimum salary per hour (0.345 Tajik Somoni = Log value of −1.0635). The somoni
(Tajik: COMHN¯) is the currency of Tajikistan.
counterparts. Income inequality is also stronger for higher earners (see Figure 3). This
preliminary evidence illustrates significant discrepancy between formal and informal
workers in Tajikistan.
In addition, descriptive statistics show that the informal sector is strongly male dom-
inated. Around 77% of informal workers are males. The average age of the workers in
informal sector is lower than the age of individuals in the formal sector. There are marked
differences between sectors in terms of education. The total number of years in schooling
is higher for formal workers. Around 65% of those working in the private sector and only
2% of public sector workers are informally employed. Informal employment is more rural
than urban with around 56% of pure defined informal workers in rural areas. Although
most studies write specifically about the informal sector in the urban areas, it is surely not
possible to deny the existence of similar enterprises in rural areas as in our case. Finally,
comparing wages across the formal and informal sectors might suggest that at least some
of the differences in wages may be due to the different distributions of occupations across
the two sectors. Around 31% of pure informal workers are employed in trade and sales,
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Figure 3 Comparing formal and informal wage distributions in Tajikistan, Q-Q plot. Source: Tajikistan
2007 LSMS.
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and around 15% are in elementary occupational jobs (unskilled workers, street vendors,
cleaners). Some regions have higher shares of informal employment. In particular the
informal employment is highest in Sogd region.
5 Econometric methodology
5.1 Machado andMata decomposition based on Oaxaca-Ransom (1994) approach
A common feature of much of the literature is that the sectoral analysis is conducted at
the mean of the earnings distribution, with no attention paid to how wage differential
may vary across the distribution. Therefore, to decompose the differential in the formal
and informal log wages into a component due to differences in labour market charac-
teristics between sectors and a component due to difference in the rewards formal and
informal workers receive for those labour market characteristics, we utilise Machado
and Mata’s (2005) technique which allows for calculation of the differential across the
whole distribution. Based on Koenker-Basset (1978), Machado and Mata (2005) pro-
pose a method to extend the traditional Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method. Their
main methodological procedure is to simulate a conditional marginal wage distribution
estimated through quantile regression. We modify that approach by introducing a mea-
sure of non-discriminating earnings structure and taking into account the index number
problem suggested in Neumark (1988) and Oaxaca and Ransom (1994). Neumark (1988)
shows that the non-discriminatory wage structure can be estimated from an earnings
equation estimated over the pooled sample of both groups. This is the non-discrimination
equation, which is the benchmark in the estimation of the Oaxaca and Ransom decompo-
sition. The question we address by the proposed decomposition framework is how much
would the formal-informal wage differential change across the distribution if both formal
and informal sector workers were paid according to a common wage structure, but their
work related attributes remain unchanged.
In order to undertake a decomposition analysis the earnings equation is estimated for
quantiles across the distribution for both formal and informal sector workers and the
counterfactual density distribution is generated following the extended Machado and
Mata (2005) methodology. Specifically, the marginal earnings distributions can be briefly
described as follows:
Step 1 : Generate a random sample of size m from a uniform distribution
U[0, 1]u1 . . . .,um. This will give a series of numbers telling us which percentiles
are to be estimated.
Step 2 : Estimate for each percentile derived in the first step, regression coefficients for
formal, informal and the pooled sample: βˆ formui (θ), βˆ inui (θ), βˆ
∗
ui(θ), i = 1 . . . .N ,
where βˆ formui (θ) are uthi quantile regression estimates taken from the log earnings
equation for formal employees; βˆ infui (θ) are uthi quantile regression estimates
taken from the log earnings equation for informal employees, and βˆ∗ui(θ) are u
th
i
quantile regression estimates taken from the log earnings equation for all
workers.
Step 3 : For each percentile, characteristics of a randomly drawn sample of 10,000
formal and informal employees (with replacement) are used to predict wages by
using the estimated coefficient vectors βˆ formui (θ), βˆ
inf
ui (θ) and βˆ∗ui(θ). This process
generates sets of predicted wages covering the whole distribution and enables us
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to calculate the wage distribution for formal informal and for both formal and
informal employees together. The vectors of characteristics for formal {X˜formi }Ni=1
and informal {X˜infi }Ni=1 are then used to predict (log) hourly earnings for formal
{w˜ formui = X˜formi βˆ formui }Ni=1 and informal sector workers {w˜infui = X˜infi βˆ infui }Ni=1.
These predicted wages are equivalent to a random sample of size N drawn from
the marginal wage distributions for formal (wform) and informal (winf )sector
workers. Counterfactual densities for the formal and informal sector employees
being rewarded equally are found as {w˜cformi = X˜formi βˆ∗ui}Ni=1 and {w˜
cinf
i = X˜infi βˆ∗ui}Ni=1
which are the densities that would arise if formal and informal workers retained
their own labour market characteristics but were paid like a randomly chosen
individual from the entire sample.
Step 4 : Differences in θ th percentiles of the estimated marginal wage distribution are
then used to decompose the formal-informal sector wage gap into an effect due
to characteristics in the formal and informal sector being rewarded differently
(coefficient effect) and an effect due to differences in the distribution of worker
characteristics in the two sectors (characteristic effect).
Thus, the contribution of any characteristics in accounting for differences in earnings
between formal and informal employees at the θ th percentile is given by:
Qθ (w˜ form|βˆ form) − Qθ (w˜inf |βˆ inf ) =
= Qθ [(w˜ form|βˆ form) − Qθ (w˜cform|βˆ∗) + Qθ (w˜cinf |βˆ∗) − Qθ (w˜inf |βˆ inf )]︸ ︷︷ ︸
+ Qθ [ (w˜cform|βˆ∗) − Qθ (w˜cinf |βˆ∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸+residuals
where Qθ is the θ th percentile of the earnings distribution and w˜i|βˆ j is the estimated
marginal earnings distribution for the ith individual based on the jth quantile regression
estimates.
The first two terms of the equation identifies the part of any wage difference explained
by differences in the returns that formal and informal workers receive for a given set of
characteristics (the coefficient effect)2. The coefficient component is considered to con-
tain the effects of both unobservable workers differences in characteristics that the labour
market rewards and the discrimination in the labour market. The third term identifies the
part of the hourly wage difference at the quantile, explained by differences in the char-
acteristics of formal and informal workers (the characteristics effect). This is the portion
of the wage differential that may be attributed to differences in the characteristics pos-
sessed by formal and informal workers. The difference between quantile of the marginal
wage densities between formal and informal employment distributions weighted by the
characteristics of workers randomly chosen in the economy does contain an additional
component, which we treat as a residual. The residual term is typically of second order of
importance and tends to became smaller with a larger number of simulations. Standard
errors for the reported components of the decomposition were obtained using a standard
bootstrapping method3.
5.2 Correcting for endogenous sector choice
Given that there is a choice being made by workers whether to work in the formal or
informal sector, there is a potential for the sample selection bias. This bias is due to
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the possibility that sorting of employees between sectors is not random and occurs on
the basis of unobserved productivity-related characteristics. The present analysis for-
mulates and estimates a model of sectoral attachment of individuals (the binary choice
model between the informal (D = 1) and formal sector work (D = 0) is considered). A
worker will be employed in a particular sector, if the offered wage exceeds the reservation
wage. We follow Buchinskys (1998) approach for the selection correction in a quantile
regression model by using the power series expansion of the inverse Mills ratio of the
normalized estimated index.
There are two issues that need to be addressed. First, there is the identification of
the selection effect and the crucial assumption is the presence of instrument and the
exclusion of this instrument from the outcome equation Melly (2006). We determine
individuals type of employment based on a land ownership, to the extent that infor-
mal activities require access to land. Second, Buchinsky (1998) correction of sample
selection in the context of quantile regression requires higher order selection terms
be included in the model. There is however, the added complication that the con-
stant term in the quantile wage regression is not identified in this instance, as it is
conflated with the constant term of the higher order power series used to control for
sample selection. The problem is one of distinguishing between the intercept and the
first term in the power series approximation to the selection correction term. Buchinsky
(2002) provides a detailed discussion of ways to identify the constant along the lines
suggested by Andrews and Schafgans (1998). In our study an assessment of the impor-
tance of the selectivity of the sector choice is made following Buchinsky (1998) based
on Andrews and Schafgans (1998) idea of identification at infinity. The intuition is as
follows: if we choose a sub-sample of workers with labour market characteristics such
that the probability of being in a given sector is arbitrary close to 1, we can use this
sub-sample to estimate the intercept in the earnings equation, without adjusting for
selection.
In order to analyse the formal-informal wage differential accounting for endogenous
sector choice, the Machado and Mata decomposition algorithm is modified. Following
Badel and Peña (2010), we calculate the selection effect as the difference between the dis-
tributions of observed and the potential wages of formal and informal sector workers.
We generate random samples of formal and informal sector workers using the formal and
informal sample selection adjusted coefficients combined with the labour market char-
acteristics of all workers not just those who work in the formal sector. The two selection
effects are given as:
Qθ (w˜ form) − Qθ (w˜cform) - selection effect for formal sector workers and
Qθ (w˜inf ) − Qθ (w˜cinf ) - selection effect for informal sector workers
w˜cformi = X˜∗i βˆ formui + ectf and w˜cinfi = X˜∗i βˆ infui + ectf with Qθ (ectf ) = 0
where w˜form and w˜inf are the observed distributions of formal and informal sector
workers; w˜cform and w˜cinf are simulated counterfactual distributions for the formal and
informal sector workers using formal and informal sector selection adjusted coefficients
and being sampled from the whole population of workers.
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The endogeneity corrected differential or the differential that we would observe if
the employees sorted randomly between sectors conditional on their characteristics is
decomposed as follows:
[
Qθ (w˜form) − Qθ (w˜cform)
]
−
[
Qθ (w˜in) − Qθ (w˜cinf )
]
Further, the selection effect can be decomposed into a portion due to observable labour
market characteristics and a portion due to unobservable characteristics by modifying
the Machado and Mata algorithm. This produces another two distributions: the distribu-
tion of formal sectors wages (respectively the distribution of informal sectors wages) that
would have prevailed if prices accounted for selection, and workers had the distribution
of labour market characteristics of formal (informal) sector workers not of all workers.
Qθ (w˜form) − Qθ (w˜cform) =
[
Qθ (w˜form) − Qθ (w˜sform)
]
−
[
Qθ (w˜cform) − Qθ (w˜sform)
]
where w˜sformi = X˜formi βˆ formui + esform with Qθ (esform) = 0
Note that in this exercise βˆ formui (θ) needs to be estimated controlling for sample selection
bias. The first term in the brackets is interpreted as the effect of unobservable, while the
second term is interpreted as the effect of observables. Specifically, the difference between
formal sector workers adjusting for selection counterfactual and the potential distribution
tells us howmuch of the selection effect can be explained by differences in the distribution
of characteristics between those who are in the formal sector and those who are not. The
selection effect for the informal sector is given in a similar way:
Qθ (w˜inf ) − Qθ (w˜cinf ) =
[
Qθ (w˜in) − Qθ (w˜sinf )
]
−
[
Qθ (w˜cinf ) − Qθ (w˜sinf )
]
where w˜sinfi = X˜infi βˆ infui + esinf with Qθ (esinf ) = 0
The endogeneity corrected differential due to the unobservable characteristics is given
as the difference between the effect of unobservables for formal and informal sector
workers:
[
Qθ (w˜form) − Qθ (w˜sform)
]
−
[
Qθ (w˜inf ) − Qθ (w˜sinf )
]
Finally, the endogeneity corrected differential due to the observable characteristics is
given as the difference between the observable components for formal and informal
sector workers:
[
Qθ (w˜cform) − Qθ (w˜sform)
]
−
[
Qθ (w˜cinf ) − Qθ (w˜sinf )
]
5.3 Matching approach
Another potential problem revealed in the literature associated with the decomposition
approach is misspecification due to differences in the supports of the empirical dis-
tribution of individual characteristics for formal and informal workers. There maybe a
combination of individual characteristics for which it is possible to find formal, but not
informal sector workers. With such combination of characteristics one cannot compare
earnings between formal and informal workers Ñopo (2008). While parametric methods
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may give biased estimates as they use observations outside the common support of indi-
vidual characteristics, the matching provides the wage outcomes of formal and informal
workers only with comparable characteristics Heckman et al. (1998). We can estimate
how much formal sector workers would earn if they had the same distribution of human
capital characteristics as informal sector workers. The current paper applies Ñopo (2008)
non-parametric technique to decompose the gap in terms of explained and unexplained
components, considering the problem of differences in the supports. The method applied
decomposes the wage differential into four additive components, three of which can be
attributed to the differences in individual characteristics and the fourth to the existence
of a combination of differences in unobservable characteristics and discrimination (see
Ñopo (2008) for more details). In that sense, the wage gap can be expressed as following
and can be interpreted as it is traditionally done in the linear decomposition setup, with
two components, one that can be explained by differences in observable characteristics
and one that cannot.
 = (M + X + F) + 0
Where:0 corresponds to the unexplained part of the gap. It is the share of the wage gap
that cannot be attributed to differences in characteristics of the individuals and is typically
attributed to a combination of both unobservable characteristics and discrimination; F
is the part of the gap that can be explained by the differences in characteristics between
two groups of informal sector individuals, that are in and out of the common support of
the variables defined by match-variables; X is the part of the gap that can be explained
by differences in the distribution of characteristics of formal and informal sector workers
over the common support; M is the part of the gap that can be explained by differences
between two groups of formal sector workers - those who have characteristics that can be
matched to the informal sector workers and those who do not;
6 Empirical results
6.1 Decomposition results
The results from the decomposition analysis are reported in Table 6. In the second col-
umn, we present the raw wage gap estimates, calculated as the difference in log hourly
wages between formal and informal sector employees at certain points of the wage dis-
tribution. In the next columns, we give the predicted wage gaps and contribution of the
coefficients and the covariates to the difference between the quantile of the formal sec-
tor wage distribution and quantile of the informal sector wage distribution, together with
the percentage of the gap that is attributable to the coefficient and covariate effects, and
residual terms due to the differences between the empirical and simulated densities. The
interesting part is the differences in rewards (the coefficient effect). If the two sectors
reward the same characteristic differently, it might be an indication of different wage
setting mechanisms in the two sectors. The bootstrapped standard errors for these con-
tributions are given in parentheses. Estimates at the 10th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 60th,
70th, 80th, and 90th percentiles are reported. The results over the whole distribution are
best viewed graphically. Figure 4 plots the estimated coefficient effects along the earnings
distribution.
The estimates show that the raw wage differential is negative but diminishes and is con-
siderably narrower at the top of the earnings distribution compared to the bottom of the
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Table 6 Decomposition of changes in parameters of the distribution, Tajikistan 2007
Percentiles Raw gap Predicted gap Due to coefficients Due to covariates Residuals
10th -1.050 -1.047 -0.443 [42%] -0.604 [58%] -0.003 [0%]
(0.0234) (0.0352) (0.0247)
20th -1.058 -1.012 -0.390 [37%] -0.622 [59%] -0.047 [4%]
(0.0185) (0.0292) (0.022)
30th -1.022 -0.974 -0.370 [36%] -0.604 [59%] -0.048 [5%]
(0.0184) (0.0274) (0.0199)
40th -0.916 -0.892 -0.343 [37%] -0.549 [60%] -0.024 [3%]
(0.0174) (0.0273) (0.0206)
50th -0.783 -0.792 -0.306 [39%] -0.486 [62%] 0.009 [-1%]
(0.018) (0.0265) (0.0193)
60th -0.758 -0.715 -0.268 [35%] -0.447 [59%] -0.042 [6%]
(0.0174) (0.0263) (0.0191)
70th -0.664 -0.669 -0.239 [36%] -0.429 [65%] 0.004 [-1%]
(0.0184) (0.0269) (0.0201)
80th -0.632 -0.639 -0.221 [35%] -0.418 [66%] 0.008 [-1%]
(0.0218) (0.0314) (0.0228)
90th -0.652 -0.633 -0.216 [33%] -0.418 [64%] -0.019 [3%]
(0.0266) (0.038) (0.0267)
Notes:Machado and Mata Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition. The bootstrapped standard errors in parenthesis. Bootstrap
estimates are based on 800 replications. The differential is calculated by every 5th percentile. The main percentile levels are
presented. The specification controls for total number years of education, potential experience, marital status, job tenure,
Tajik ethnicity, dummies for female, being in a private sector, rural settlement and occupational dummies.
distribution. The raw wage gap is sizeable, especially at the lower end of the distribu-
tion. Both coefficients and covariates contribute to the actual wage gap and their effect is
significantly different from zero. The largest fraction of the formal-informal wage gap is
attributable to the differences in characteristics. Overall, the model works fairly well, as
the residuals account for a relatively small portion of the total wage gap.
The unexplained component of the inter-sectoral wage differential (coefficient effect)
works in favour of the informal sector (see Table 6). The coefficient effect is negative
across the whole earnings distribution. The penalty faced by formal sector workers is
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Figure 4 Formal/informal wage differential across earnings distribution in Tajiksitan.
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especially large at the lower end of the distribution where the informal sector employees
earn substantially higher wage premium. The wage penalty for formal workers ranges
between 42% of the relevant gap at the bottom of the earnings distribution to around
33% at the top of the distribution. Overall, at the top of the distribution, informal workers
face a lower wage premium. This might be due to the fact that at the top of the earnings
distribution formal workers tend to be in larger firms which pay higher wages and we
might expect higher incentives to be registered. The large informal earnings found here
are in line with Marcouiller et al. (1997) who find a wage premium associated with work
in informal sector in Mexico which they explain with different benefit systems in the two
sectors.
Note also that our sample is strongly male dominated and this might affect the results4.
However, a detailed examination of formal versus informal wage differential amongmales
indicates that identical male workers still earned more in the informal sector than in
the formal one. Interestingly, the covariate effect is negative across the whole earnings
distribution, indicating that informal workers strongly dominate with their endowment
component. Moreover, at the top end of the earnings distribution, the large proportion of
the raw gap about 64% appears to be the result of characteristics effect. We find the high-
est fraction of the gap is attributable to differences in characteristics. However as higher
education seems to be associated with the formal employment, we might indicate that
factors other than human capital endowments explain the wage disparities in the country
generally attributed to labour market imperfections.
6.2 Endogeneity corrected sector wage differential
The simulated differential corrected for endogenous sector choice, presented in Table 7
is the differential that we observe if the employees were sorted randomly between sec-
tors conditionally on their labour market characteristics. Further, we present the gap that
remains due to the unobservable characteristics and gap due to observable characteris-
tics. The bootstrapped standard errors for these contributions are given in parenthesis.
Bootstrap estimates are based on 800 replications.
Before presenting the results concerning the formal-informal wage differential, onemay
be interested in individual characteristics correlated with formality status in Tajikistan.
In order to model the selection between the formal and informal sectors, the probability
of employment in the formal sector is estimated and significance of the land ownership
as a valid instrument is discussed. Table 8 presents the probit estimates for determi-
nants of the formality status. It can be seen that the number of years in education is
significant and increases the probability of being in formal sector. The probability of
being a formal employee is higher for those with 3–5 years job tenure, but lower for
those with 6–10 years. The probability of formal employment declines with age. Females
in Tajikistan are less likely to be in the formal sector. Being married and belonging to
Tajik ethnic group have a strong, positive and significant effect. Illiteracy in Tajikistan
is negatively associated with formal sector activity which suggests that workers with-
out any basic educational skills are less likely to be in the formal sector. The variable
measuring land ownership has a significant and negative effect on the probability of
being in formal sector, which is not surprising given that agricultural activities in rural
areas are closely related with informal sector employment. The occupational variables
are statistically significant. The largest positive quantitative impact on the probability
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Table 7 Decomposition of formal-informal wage differential correcting for endogeneity,
Tajikistan 2007
Percentiles Endogeneity corrected differential Gap due to unobservable Gap due to observables
10th -0.927 -0.537 -0.390
(0.034) (0.025) (0.028)
20th -0.689 -0.868 0.179
(0.029) (0.027) (0.027)
30th -0.665 -0.970 0.304
(0.033) (0.019) (0.026)
40th -0.667 -0.892 0.225
(0.027) (0.019) (0.019)
50th -0.546 -0.897 0.351
(0.024) (0.035) (0.035)
60th -0.392 -1.335 0.942
(0.025) (0.027) (0.026)
70th -0.262 -1.625 1.363
(0.025) (0.024) (0.023)
80th -0.095 -1.116 1.021
(0.030) (0.060) (0.058)
90th 0.112 -0.407 0.519
(0.040) (0.047) (0.039)
Notes:Machado and Mata Oaxaca-Ransom decomposition correcting for endogenous sector choice. The bootstrapped
standard errors in parenthesis. Bootstrap estimates are based on 800 replications. The differential is calculated by every 5th
percentile. The main percentile levels are presented. The specification controls for total number years of education,
potential experience, marital status, job tenure, Tajik ethnicity, dummies for female, being in a private sector, rural
settlement and occupational dummies.
of informal employment arises in trade, sales and machine operations occupational
categories
The endogeneity corrected estimates reported in Table 7 clearly indicate that non-
random sector selection is important issue in the calculation of the formal-informal wage
differential. The inclusion of the selectivity corrected power series terms in the com-
putation of the sector wage gap seems to produce different estimates compared to the
uncorrected wage gap estimates5. We find that endogeneity corrected differential tends
to be lower as compared to the predicted gap without considering endogeneity. The pre-
mium for the formal sector workers decreases throughout the wage distribution and again
the estimated differential is negative across the whole earnings distribution. Only at the
top of the distribution, there is a sort of positive discrimination, in the sense that for-
mal sector workers with higher skills have better returns than informal sector workers
with similar skills. The distributional methodology applied, allows us to decompose the
selection effect into a portion due to observable labour market characteristics, and the
remainder due to unobservable. Selection is due both to differences in the labour market
characteristics between formal and informal sector workers and to unobserved charac-
teristics. In contrast to the previous estimates, the effect of the observable is found to be
positive across suggesting that those who select themselves into formal sector employ-
ment actually have more favourable characteristics than do their informal counterparts.
Only at the bottom of the distribution, the characteristics effect is found to be negative.
6.3 Matching approach
Finally, taking advantage of matching approach, which allows us to compare similarly-
skilled formal and informal sector workers, we consider differences in the distribution
2014, 3:1
http://www.izajold.com/content/3/1/1
Staneva and Arabsheibani IZA Journal of Labor & Development Page 19 of 24
Table 8 Probit model of formal sector employment
Formal sector employment
School 0.0418***
(-4.64)
Age -0.0143
(-1.26)
agesq 0.0001
(-0.92)
Less than 7 months 0.0725
-1.17
1–2 years 0.3797***
(-6.79)
3–5 years 0.4113***
(-7.65)
6–10 years 0.3698***
(-5.57)
Married 0.2711***
(-5.47)
Tajik ethnicity 0.1099*
(-2.54)
Illiterate -0.3518**
(-3.09)
Female -0.1646***
(-3.57)
Private 0.4141***
(-9.76)
Land ownership -0.1693***
(-4.22)
Administrative 3.3367***
(-14.69)
Skilled & trade -1.6965***
(-7.36)
Service 2.7937***
(-12.26)
Sales 2.9443***
(-12.7)
Machine operators -2.5380***
(-11.14)
Regions Yes
_cons -3.0363***
(-9.95)
N 8123
Log-Likelihood -3052.9689
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
of their observed characteristics. Table 9 reports the descriptive statistics of the formal
and informal sector workers after the matching and Table 10 shows delta method results
and distributional estimates recognizing the existence of differences in the supports and
considering differences in the distributions on the common support. The characteris-
tics for the matched formal workers gets closer to the informal sector workers, however
the gap in their earnings is still evident. As can be seen, there is little difference in
the average years of education in the two sectors. In contrast, there are some notable
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Table 9 Descriptive statistics of the sample after matching
Formal Informal
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Log of hourly wage 0.961 1.257 1.990 1.108
Years in education 9.468 1.920 9.351 1.630
Age 32.457 11.310 33.479 11.499
Age squared 1181.318 798.112 1252.933 822.073
1 if less than 7 months 0.108 0.311 0.160 0.367
1 if 1 if 7–12 months 0.071 0.257 0.101 0.302
1 if 1–2 years 0.217 0.413 0.233 0.423
1 if 3–5 years 0.295 0.456 0.262 0.440
1 if 6–10 years 0.099 0.298 0.088 0.283
1 if married 0.666 0.472 0.692 0.462
1 if Tajik ethnicity 0.720 0.449 0.742 0.438
1 if Female 0.421 0.494 0.199 0.400
1 if in Private sector 0.658 0.475 0.635 0.482
1 if Administrative 0.016 0.127 0.002 0.043
1 if Skilled &Trade 0.049 0.215 0.252 0.434
1 if Service 0.501 0.500 0.145 0.352
1 if Sales 0.125 0.330 0.299 0.458
1 if Machines &oper 0.035 0.184 0.130 0.336
1 if Elementary 0.105 0.307 0.172 0.378
1 if Rural 0.812 0.390 0.715 0.452
1 if Dushanbe region 0.086 0.280 0.142 0.349
1 if Sogd region 0.166 0.372 0.325 0.468
1 if Khatlon region 0.535 0.499 0.237 0.425
1 if Rrp region 0.156 0.363 0.248 0.432
1 if Gbao region 0.057 0.232 0.049 0.215
1887 1069
differences in industry distribution across sectors. For example, a much larger propor-
tion of the workforce in the formal sector is employed in service sector. It is found
that informal sector worker earns on average 32 percentage more than a typical for-
mal worker. We focus mainly on the analysis of the quantile distribution of unexplained
differences in pay, which have been taken as the difference between the wage distribu-
tions at the respective percentiles after matching. As before, we find that informal sector
workers are overpaid and the premium decreases along the wage distribution. Restrict-
ing the analysis to those individuals with comparable characteristics in both sectors, still
the more qualified formal sector workers do face a wage penalty across the entire earn-
ings distribution. After matching on age, marital status, years of education, job tenure,
private sector and rural settlement, the decomposition reveals that differences in the
distributions of individual characteristics on the common support accounts for a large
share of the gap (X = −8.5%). The most important component of the gap is due
to the unexplained part of the gap (0). The comparative question is to what extent
do the results obtained by matching differ from those obtained by MM decomposition
approach. We empirically show that there are not substantial differences in the overall
trend, however accounting for sector differences in the supports changes the unexplained
differences in earnings from a negative coefficient of 0.443 at the 10th percentile to a
negative 1.05.
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Table 10 Decomposion of the formal-informal sector gap, matching approach
Total gap F 0 X M Unexplained Explained perc F perc I
-0.430 0.013 -0.319 -0.085 -0.038 -0.319 -0.110 28.5% 53.0%
(0.015)
Wage gap for different percentiles of the wage distribution
10th 20th 30th 40th 50th 60th 70th 80th 90th
On the support
-1.050 -1.088 -1.062 -0.944 -0.734 -0.660 -0.531 -0.490 -0.322
Out-of-support
-1.050 -0.998 -0.981 -0.875 -0.808 -0.726 -0.644 -0.688 -0.614
Notes: The variables included in the specification are age, marital status, years of education, job tenure, private sector, rural
settlement; perc F is the percentage of the formal sector individuals that are in the common support of the matching
variables; perc I is the percentage of the informal sector individuals that are in the common support.
Comparing the decomposition based on quantile regressions with the decomposition
based on matching, we find no substantial differences. The estimated differential is found
to be in favour of informal sector workers. Clearly, the MM approach adopts a non-
discriminatory wage structure as a benchmark, whereas the endogeneity corrected and
matching do not use it, hence a comparison between the three approaches is not feasible.
However, the methods applied could provide interesting policy relevant results.
7 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the existing literature by defining informal sector employment
and decomposing differences in earnings distribution between formal and informal sector
employment for Tajikistan, a country whit a limited evidence on informal sector employ-
ment. Our objective was to analyse the differential using different econometric techniques
taking into account not only the explained and unexplained components but also consid-
ering the problem of differences in the support. The Machado and Mata (2005) method
is applied, which is designed to simulate the counterfactual distribution that would arise
if formal and informal sector workers retained their own labour market characteristics
but were paid like a randomly chosen individual from the entire sample. The decomposi-
tion analysis amounts to examine the extent to which the observed earnings differential
is attributable to differences in the observable characteristics and differences in returns
to these characteristics. The possibility of endogenous sector choice is also accounted for.
Finally, the advantage of matching decomposition of the gap is explicitly to account for
differences in the supports of the distribution of characteristics. The method provides
useful information on the unexplained wage gap not only at the mean, but also on the
distribution of the gap over the entire wage distribution.
Our findings report a significant high level of informal employment in Tajikistan and
a sizeable gap for all the measures used into the analysis. Around 65% of the 2007 Tajik
sample is classified as informal in at least one of the proposed definitions, with males
having higher informal employment rates than females. Informal sector workers tend to
be less qualified and more likely to be employed in the trade and sales services. Around
65–67% of private sector workers are informally employed.
The uncorrected wage differential estimates indicate a strong wage penalty for formal
sector workers throughout the whole earning distribution. The penalty is especially large
at the lower end of the distribution, where 48% of the observed wage gap is attributed
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to differences in returns. After performing the matching comparisons, the unexplained
earnings differential continues to favour informal sector workers. Following Marcouiller
et al. (1997) we attribute the informal sector wage premium in Tajikistan on the ground of
compensating differentials theory, which would lead one to expect informal sector wages
to be higher than formal sector wages. Benefits obviously differ between workers covered
by social security and those who are not. The decomposition results reveals that approx-
imately 60–70% of the observed uncorrected differential can be ascribed to differences
in distribution of characteristics between formal and informal sector workers. At the top
end of the conditional earnings distribution, the characteristics effect plays a larger role
in explaining the formal sector wage gap. Nonetheless, most of the formal sector wage
gap across the distribution continues to be accounted for by differences in how the two
sectors are rewarded.
Our findings suggest that the difference between formal and informal labour income are
important and it is necessary to continue monitoring the effects of the policies designed
to reduce the informal sector employment.
Endnotes
1The current paper focuses on the informal employment using household level data
and does not look at the informal activities at macro-level.
2Specifically, the technique allows the discrimination component to be disaggregated
into overpayment of formal workers (formal sector advantage) and underpayment of
informal workers(informal sector disadvantage). We do not attempt in our study to
decompose into these two components.
3Bootstrap estimates are based on 800 replications.
477% of the informal employees are males.
5The selection due to the unobservables into the informal sector is not the same at the
lowest and highest quantiles. A brief insight on the informal workers earnings functions,
corrected for selectivity bias indicate significant sample selection at the lowest quantile
level, which indicates that informal sector workers seem to be drawn from the lower end
of the wage distribution and that being part of the informal sector is really a choice of
low-income individuals. The results for formal sector counterparts indicate the presence
of sample selection bias for individuals at the 25th quantile and not jointly significance
for the rest of the earning distribution.
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